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H istorical meta-epistemology, to use Ian Hacking's term, is a method for understanding epistemological concepts. It involves studying the evolution of such concepts as they change depending on who is using 
them and in what historical period. An important example of 
such a concept is objectivity: "Objectivity denotes a family of 
ideas, from matriarch to great-grandchild, from renegade uncle 
to stalwart but lonely aunt."1 That the collection of 'objectivities' 
should be expressed by a metaphor is particularly apt, as meta-
phor is an important means by which different conceptions of 
objectivity are expressed. Metaphors are especially prominent in 
the work of two major theorists of scientific objectivity, Sir Fran-
cis Bacon and Sir Karl Popper. An analysis of these metaphors 
sheds light on the theories' key elements, basic assumptions, and 
respective conceptual, cultural, and historical contexts. The re-
sults of this analysis point to a problematic relationship between 
Bacon and Popper's theories of objectivity and the metaphors 
used to express them. 
In terms of procedure, I begin by clarifying what I under-
stand by "metaphor." I then analyse Bacon and Popper's meta-
phors by paying close attention to their metaphorical language. 
Finally, I expose the problems posed for these theories as a result 
of their use of metaphor, and sketch some of the ways in which 
metaphor can help yield a better understanding of epistemologi-
cal concepts and of science. 
 
Adam Westra graduates this May, after having completed the Honours 
Philosophy program at the University of British Columbia, in Vancou-
ver. He is originally from Calgary, Alberta, and has also lived in France 
and the Netherlands. In the fall, he will begin a Master's program in phi-
losophy at the Université de Montréal, where he will study philosophical 
hermeneutics, ancient philosophy, and Kant.  
WHAT IS METAPHOR? 
 
There are many theories of metaphor. As a result, there 
are many different, sometimes conflicting, views of metaphor's 
nature and function. Choosing one particular theory would re-
quire extensive justification, which I am unable to provide here – 
that would be a paper in itself. Also, as Ortony has pointed out, 
one's view of metaphor often depends on one's view of objectiv-
ity, and vice versa – and I do not wish to pre-judge my topic.2 As a 
result of these considerations, I suggest the following broad, non-
technical – and, I hope, uncontroversial – formulation of meta-
phor: "the essence of metaphor is understanding […] one kind of thing 
in terms of another."3 Metaphor is expressed by metaphorical lan-
guage; this broad conception includes simile and analogy. On 
this basis, I will identify and analyse the metaphors present in 
Bacon and Popper's theories; the analysis will reveal their nature 




Sir Francis Bacon, "the father of modern science," as he is 
sometimes called, is one of the most important figures in the his-
tory and philosophy of science. There is no doubt that, for Bacon, 
modern science is meant to be objective.4 His intentions are clear: 
"I am building in the human understanding a true model of the 
world, not such as a man's own reason would have it be."5 Else-
where, he states that scientific knowledge refers to the universe, 
not to man.6 Bacon relies heavily on metaphors to explain and 
defend his conception of scientific objectivity. In fact, almost 
every page of the New Organon contains metaphorical language, 
and extended metaphorical passages are common. These meta-
phors express Bacon's vision of objective knowledge, his method 
for obtaining such knowledge, and the legitimacy, justification, 
and value of his project. 
What is objective knowledge, for Bacon? Objectivity is 
best understood in relation to its converse, subjectivity.7 Bacon 
expresses the nature of subjective and objective knowledge by 
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means of the metaphor of light. Bacon devotes a great deal of ef-
fort to characterizing human subjectivity and explaining how it 
results in erroneous beliefs about the world. His treatment of the 
Four Idols is well known, and, although it is thoroughly meta-
phorical, I will not go into it here because it has already been 
studied extensively. The metaphor of light condenses the conclu-
sions of the Four Idols treatment into a single image: "the human 
understanding is like a false mirror which, receiving rays irregu-
larly, distorts and discolors the nature of things by mingling its 
own nature with it."8 The idea that the mind is a mirror which 
reflects the external world is one of the oldest and most deeply-
rooted beliefs in Western philosophy. This metaphor clearly ex-
poses one of Bacon's most basic assumptions about the nature of 
the mind. It can also be seen as a manifestation of a general oper-
ating assumption common to many philosophers of the seven-
teenth century, namely, that any account of knowledge must be-
gin with an account of the mind.  
Bacon's conception of objective knowledge is expressed 
by the same light metaphor: "the knowledge of simple natures 
well examined and defined is as light."9 This light, however, is 
not scattered or distorted by the uneven mirror of the mind; 
rather, objective knowledge is a reflection of the "genuine rays of 
things."10 It is attained in the following manner: "I, on the con-
trary, dwelling purely and constantly among the facts of nature, 
withdraw my intellect from them no further than may suffice to 
let the images and rays of natural objects meet in a point, as they 
do in the sense of vision; whence it follows that the strength and 
excellency of wit has but little to do in the matter."11 Objective 
knowledge is genuine knowledge of the facts of nature, inde-
pendent of subjective distortions.12 This metaphor is completely 
intelligible to readers today, as we are familiar with the phe-
nomenon of the refraction of light and its role in vision. But it is 
precisely because this imagery is so commonplace to us that we 
risk missing the full significance of the metaphor in Bacon’s phi-
losophy. For that, we must relate it to its historical context. What 
we discover is that such a metaphor simply would not have been 
possible before the seventeenth century. Bacon is referring to the 
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spectacular contemporary discoveries in the field of optics re-
garding the composition and refraction of light, the properties of 
convex and concave lenses, the working of the eye, etc. by men 
like Kepler, Newton, and Descartes. The historical context, thus, 
allows us to appreciate the novelty of Bacon's metaphor. It also 
reveals its powerful rhetorical function: Bacon manages to associ-
ate his conception of objectivity with the revolutionary discover-
ies and progress made by the scientific greats of his century. Fi-
nally, we see that Bacon's argument is circular in that this meta-
phor for objectively true scientific knowledge relies on our prior 
acceptance of the objective truth of the scientific discoveries upon 
which it is based. 
Bacon, like many other philosophers of the seventeenth 
century, believed that a proper method was the key to obtaining 
knowledge. As has already been stated, there was also a strong 
preoccupation with the mind during that period. In addition, Ba-
con attached a high value to instruments - products of, and 
means for producing, works. All of these motivations are com-
bined in a metaphor: method is an instrument for the mind. This 
metaphor is so important that it is introduced in the second 
aphorism of the New Organon: "Neither the naked hand nor the 
understanding left to itself can effect much. It is by instruments 
and helps that the work is done, which are as much wanted for 
the understanding as for the hand. And as the instruments of the 
hand either give motion or guide it, so the instruments of the 
mind supply either suggestions for the understanding or cau-
tions."13 Bacon's method is a collection of instruments that cau-
tion the human understanding against the dangers of subjectiv-
ity, and guide it towards objective knowledge of nature by 
means of the true induction.  
The instruments of the mind metaphor is justified by the 
power and utility of the instruments of the hand in Bacon's 
world. Of "printing, gunpowder, and the magnet," he claims that 
"no empire, no sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power 
and influence in human affairs than these mechanical arts."14 
Thus "human knowledge and human power meet in one;" each 
justifies the other.15 Via the mariner's needle, Bacon metaphori-
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cally links global exploration with intellectual exploration. This 
instrument, a guide to the mariner, made possible the discovery 
of the New World. Likewise, Bacon's intellectual instrument, a 
guide to the mind, will open up vast new intellectual horizons.16 
Thus, by means of metaphor, Bacon manages to associate his 
method with the most successful instruments of his day, and all 
of their impressive and valuable discoveries.  
The metaphor also functions polemically: it is a devastat-
ing illustration of the obsolescence of Scholasticism and the an-
cient knowledge upon which it was based. Aristotle had simply 
never seen printing, gunpowder, or magnets; his intellectual ho-
rizon encompassed the Old World, but not beyond. This power-
ful rhetoric was made possible by the historical circumstances. 
Bacon's metaphor reveals how closely objectivity in the seven-
teenth century was associated with technological developments. 
Here we see the beginnings of the linkage of objective science 
with progress, an important idea in the history of objectivity. It is 
important to note that for Bacon, unlike for many later thinkers 
(e.g. Popper), objective science is linked not to an abstract concep-
tion of progress (e.g. Popper's formula for rational progression), 
but to concrete technological products – instruments that tangi-
bly increase man's power over the natural world. 
For Bacon, objective science's legitimacy, justification, and 
value are metaphorically expressed through the image of fruit. 
Indeed, all three of these elements are brought together by the 
metaphor of fruit. This metaphor links Bacon's objective science 
to a religious context: "Wherefore, as in religion we are warned 
to show our faith by works, so in philosophy by the same rule 
the system should be judged of by its fruits, and be pronounced 
frivolous if it be barren; more especially if, in place of fruits of 
grape and olive, it bears thorns and briars of dispute and conten-
tion."17 The value of Bacon’s philosophy derives from its capacity 
to produce fruits: knowledge and technology that increase man's 
power over nature. These fruits also justify it, just as the faithful 
are justified on the Day of Judgment by their good works. 
This metaphor, explicitly linked as it is to religion, can 
only be fully understood in its specifically Christian context. 
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Fruit imagery is ubiquitous in the Bible; Bacon's Christian read-
ers would likely have associated his metaphor with a passage 
like this one, from Jesus' Sermon on the Mount: "Beware of false 
prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing but inwardly are 
ravenous wolves. You will know them by their fruits. Are grapes 
gathered from thorns, or figs from thistles? In the same way, 
every good tree bears good fruit, but the bad tree bears bad 
fruit."18 Fruits, according to this way of thinking, are objective 
evidence of legitimacy. Indeed, the need to distinguish false 
prophets from legitimate ones was especially acute in Bacon's 
time. The seventeenth century was characterized by religious 
turmoil, after new "prophets" like Luther and Calvin had pro-
claimed new religious truths, and accusations of heresy flew 
back and forth. Bacon's fruit metaphor would have resonated 
with readers who desperately sought objective proof of legiti-
macy and truth in an age when all was in doubt, in religion as in 
philosophy. 
The image of fruit and the associated images of harvest-
ing express Bacon's deeply religious view of the task of science: 
redemption. Fruits are cultivated and harvested by the farmer; 
Bacon patiently applies his method to produce works. "For 
though it is true that I am principally in pursuit of works […], yet 
I wait for harvest time, and do not attempt to mow the moss or to 
reap the green corn."19 Bacon, as the farmer, assumes the role of 
Adam, who was condemned to labour the earth in the sweat of 
his brow as a punishment for original sin.20 The religious hope is 
that  such labour is redemptive, that "if we labour in thy works 
with the sweat of our brows, thou wilt make us partakers of thy 
vision and thy Sabbath."21 Objective knowledge (God's vision) 
and spiritual redemption (God's Sabbath) meet in one. Bacon 
firmly anchors his project's legitimacy, justification, and value in 




Sir Karl Popper was one of the most influential propo-
nents of scientific objectivity of the twentieth century. His posi-
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tion is clear: "All work in science is work directed towards the 
growth of objective knowledge. We are workers who are adding 
to the growth of objective knowledge as masons work on a cathe-
dral."22 As this quotation illustrates, Popper, like Bacon, was 
strongly committed to scientific objectivity, and employed meta-
phor to explain and defend his position.  
Popper's account of objective knowledge rests on his on-
tology of the three worlds: the physical world, the mental world, 
and "the world of intelligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense; it is 
the world of possible objects of thought, the world of theories in 
themselves, and their logical relations; of arguments in them-
selves; and of problem situations in themselves."23 All objective 
knowledge belongs to and thereby constitutes "World 3." 
In "Knowledge: Objective Versus Subjective," Popper 
takes a "biological approach" to World 3; that is, he explains it in 
biological terms. His first thesis regarding World 3 is that it is 
produced by humans: "World 3 is a natural product of the hu-
man animal, comparable to a spider's web."24 Popper's second 
thesis is that World 3 is autonomous.25 This is the crux of his ar-
gument: theories-in themselves and the other members of World 
3 are emphatically not mental ideas in the subjective sense – if 
they were, they would not be objective. In order to explain these 
two theses, Popper invokes several more analogies: "nests built 
by wasps or ants; the burrows of badgers, dams constructed by 
beavers, or paths made by animals in forests."26 Popper's third 
thesis explicitly appeals to analogy: "there is a close analogy be-
tween the growth of objective knowledge and biological growth; 
that is, the evolution of plants and animals."27  
How are we to understand this "biological approach?" 
Bloor explains the strategy as follows: "the point of these analo-
gies is that they allow a naturalistic conception of knowledge as 
being man-made, but they indicate that, once produced, it is in-
dependent of its maker."28 This is, indeed, Popper's main argu-
mentative point, but I think that the analogies convey much 
more than this by means of their extended associations.  
Nests, dams, burrows, and the like are all tangible physi-
cal objects. In the context of the analogy, this is so obvious as to 
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go without saying, but, in fact, Popper wants very much for the 
attribute of tangibility to be associated with objective knowl-
edge.29 Indeed, elsewhere Popper explains our interaction with 
objective knowledge in precisely such terms: "[the mind] can also 
'see' or 'grasp' an arithmetical or geometrical object; a number, or 
a geometrical figure. But although, in this sense, 'see' or 'grasp' is 
used in a metaphorical way, it nevertheless denotes a real rela-
tionship between the mind and its intelligible object."30 This objec-
tivity reinforces, and is reinforced by, other metaphors, like 
knowledge is a cathedral, that also make this association. Together, 
these metaphors ease tensions in Popper's ontology. For exam-
ple, qua physical objects, books and libraries belong to the physi-
cal world; qua humanly-produced objective knowledge, they be-
long to World 3. The metaphorical association of World 3 with 
physical objects eases (or hides) such tensions, because within 
the context of the analogies, where everything is physical, there 
is no such contradiction.  
These analogies associatively imbue scientific objectivity 
with several glowing attributes. Nests and spiders' webs and the 
like are complex, ordered, creative, and indispensable to sur-
vival. This can be read as an effective rhetorical device, and also 
as a testament to how highly Popper esteems objective science 
and its role in society.  
The last feature to which I wish to draw attention is the 
wider context of the analogies. The objects Popper employs to 
express his vision of objectivity are significant for their intrinsic 
attributes, as we have seen, but it is essential to see that Popper 
explicitly characterizes them as objects of study, within the frame-
work of biological science.31 The acquisition of objective knowl-
edge is likened to animal and plant evolution – a reference to 
evolutionary theory in biology. Elsewhere, Popper compares sci-
entific progress to DNA replication, thereby situating his theory 
in the framework of genetics. Now, if one were asked which field 
of science achieved the greatest and most influential break-
throughs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there is no 
doubt that biology, with its theories of evolution and genetics, 
would be one of the prime candidates. The choice of analogies 
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from biology is far from accidental. Popper is associating his the-
ory of scientific objectivity with arguably the most successful sci-
entific field of his day. This is the same strategy that Bacon used 
in the case of optics; it is just as rhetorically effective, and just as 
circular.  
I agree with Bloor that, for the most part, these biological 
analogies effectively communicate Popper's conception of objec-
tive knowledge.32 The problem, however, is that Popper also de-
fends his view by analogy; he moves from the realm of biology to 
World 3 to make positive claims, but retreats back to the realm of 
biology to defend himself. For example, Popper addresses the 
objections to his ontology as follows: "The thesis of the existence 
of such a world of problem situations will strike many as ex-
tremely metaphysically dubious. But it can be defended by 
pointing out its biological analogue. For example, it has its full 
analogue in birds' nests."33 In like manner, he attempts to refute 
the subjectivist approach to knowledge with analogies: "This 
view is mistaken in many ways. A wasps' nest is a wasps' nest 
even after it has been deserted […] A bird's nest is a bird's nest 
even if it was never lived in."34 The fundamental problem with 
this argumentative strategy is that it misuses analogy: analogy 
can be used to explain a thesis, but not to justify it. At least, this 
is so in a case like Popper's, who clearly conceives his theory to 
be independent of the analogy (i.e., to be independently valid and 
apply beyond the realm of biology). The theory is the subject-
matter of the objections, not the analogy. Thus, if Popper's theory 
is to be independently valid and applicable, it must be defend-
able on its own terms, but, instead, Popper retreats to his bird's 
nest.35 
Popper employs this same strategy elsewhere. In "Normal 
Science and Its Dangers," he addresses Kuhn's challenge to his 
account of scientific objectivity. He presents his version of 
Kuhn's view in the following terms: "This is a widely accepted 
and indeed a fashionable thesis: the thesis of relativism. And it is 
a logical thesis. … I have dubbed this thesis The Myth of the 
Framework […] I regard it as a logical and philosophical mis-
take."36 This quotation illustrates the contradictory nature of Pop-
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per's argumentative strategy. On the one hand, the opposing the-
sis is characterized in logical terms. On the other hand, Popper's 
frames the debate in terms that are not logical at all, but meta-
phorical: the opposing thesis is not a logical argument, but rather 
a passing "fashion," en vogue this season, soon to be passé; more-
over, the thesis does not even belong to the realm of logic and 
philosophy – it is a "myth," irrational and false. Thus Popper 
himself is guilty of making a "logical and philosophical mistake:" 
according to his formulation, the thesis of relativism is both logi-
cal and alogical. 
Popper replies to this thesis by a series of metaphors and 
analogies, not by strictly logical argument. Indeed, he never 
really interprets the relativist thesis logically, so it is not surpris-
ing that he does not refute them in such terms. Rather, he inter-
prets the thesis metaphorically, and responds in kind:  
 
I do admit that at any moment we are prisoners 
caught in the framework of our theories; our ex-
pectations; our past experiences; our language. 
But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: if we 
try, we can break out of our framework at any 
time. Admittedly, we shall find ourselves again in 
a framework, but it will be a better and roomier 
one; and we can at any moment break out of it 
again.37  
 
Similarly, his reply to the relativist idea that "different frame-
works are like mutually untranslatable languages" remains inter-
nal to the analogy. He points out that different languages, like 
English and Hopi, can in fact be translated.38 
After several additional metaphors, Popper concludes his 
attack on the Myth of the Framework by restating his account of 
scientific objectivity: "'scientific knowledge' may be regarded as 
subjectless. It may be regarded as a system of theories on which 
we work as do masons on a cathedral."39 We are back where we 
started; Popper's explanation of objectivity and his defence of it 
are thoroughly metaphorical. 




The foregoing analysis of metaphor in Bacon and Pop-
per's theories of objectivity reveals, in short, that metaphor ex-
plains and defends key concepts in a fashion that could not be 
done literally, and links each theory to the wider conceptual, cul-
tural, and historical context upon which it depends. These theo-
ries are not independent of the metaphors used to explain and 
defend them. In reality, metaphor is significantly constitutive of 
them. Herein lies the problem. Metaphor, given its nature and 
function in Bacon and Popper's theories, does not match their 
own conceptions of what objectivity is supposed to be. Metaphor 
is not objective, but their theories of objectivity are significantly 
metaphorical. The result is a dilemma, of which both horns lead 
to the same problematic result. On the one hand, to the extent 
that we accept the metaphors, we must reject their accounts of 
objectivity. On the other hand, to the extent that we reject the 
metaphors, we must reject the accounts of objectivity to which 
they are integral.40 I will now outline the problem as it arises in 
connection with three central characteristics of objectivity for Ba-
con and Popper: the distinction between knower and known, the 
association of objectivity and rationality, and the rejection of 
frameworks. 
Objectivity is founded on the distinction between the 
knower and the known. Subject and object are meant to be as dis-
tinct as possible. For Bacon, objective knowledge refers to the 
universe, not to man. For Popper, "knowledge in the objective 
sense is knowledge without a knower: it is knowledge without a know-
ing subject."41 In metaphor, however, the knower and the known 
are not separate. Rather, the essence of metaphor is to condense 
and unite the various elements under consideration into a single 
image, which cannot be teased apart. Metaphor makes the 
boundaries between categories fluid, not rigid. In addition, meta-
phor, in order to be understood, implicates a situated subject. It 
is a view from somewhere, a viewpoint of someone in particular. 
Understanding Bacon's fruit metaphor, for example, depends on 
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assuming the particular perspective of an educated, Christian 
person in the seventeenth century. So, to the extent that Bacon 
and Popper's theories are constituted by metaphor, they are not, 
by their own standards, objective. Thus, if we reject metaphor 
because it is not objective, we must then reject the theories on the 
same grounds. On the other hand, if we accept that Bacon and 
Popper's theories contribute to the growth of knowledge, then 
we must also accept that metaphor tells us something true about 
the world, and that therefore, contrary to these same theories, 
that there is such a thing as non-objective knowledge.  
Objectivity, according to Bacon and Popper, is supposed 
to be associated with rationality (recall also that both philoso-
phers accuse rival accounts of being illogical and irrational). For 
Popper, scientific progress is a rational process. Bacon claims that 
by means of his philosophy he has "established forever a true 
and lawful marriage between the empirical and rational fac-
ulty."42 This quotation illustrates the problem vividly. The very 
statement which asserts the rationality of objective science liter-
ally makes no sense. Faculties are not persons: it makes no sense to 
say that they can be married. How can a philosophy be a mar-
riage at all? But the metaphor asserts just this, it asserts that Ba-
con's philosophy is something which it obviously is not. Indeed, 
"we can even say, in a general fashion, that the strategy of dis-
course by means of which the metaphoric utterance obtains its 
result is absurdity."43 Moreover, logical statements are, by the 
Law of the Excluded Middle, either true or false. Popper lays 
great emphasis on the falsifiability of scientific theories. But 
metaphors are not obviously falsifiable. Take Popper's claim that 
"we can break out of our prison at any moment." In virtue of 
what is it true or false? How could it be falsified? Either the 
above statements and all those like them are absurd, in which 
case the theoretical claims they make are also absurd, or they are 
not absurd and the account of objective truth is mistaken (or at 
least incomplete).  
For Bacon and Popper, science yields objective knowl-
edge of the universe as it is in itself, not relative to humans. With 
Popper this conception is especially important, as he must de-
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fend it against rival theories which stress the importance of 
frameworks in science and indeed all human knowledge acquisi-
tion. Through our analysis of metaphor, however, we have seen 
that frameworks are essential to these very theories of objectivity. 
First of all, metaphor links these theories to the wider frame-
works in which they have their being (e.g. for Bacon: religion, 
optics, technological inventions, global exploration). Moreover, 
just as Kuhn suggests that frameworks, or paradigms, can be 
thought of as metaphors blown large, I believe that metaphors 
are mini-frameworks. So when Popper, for example, likens 
World 3 to the productions of birds and other animals, he actu-
ally incorporates it into whole system of associations, like tangi-
bility, utility, complexity, and so forth. The theories belong to 
large frameworks, and are themselves made up of mini-
frameworks. When it comes to defending his theory against "The 
Myth of the Framework," Popper resorts to a whole string of 
metaphors; while he insists that frameworks do not constrain us 
because we can escape from them, he is capable neither of escap-
ing from them, nor of providing an answer which would be veri-
fiable or falsifiable outside of these frameworks. Either we accept 
metaphor and its associated frameworks as integral to the theo-
ries of objectivity, in which case the theories refute themselves, or 
we reject these frameworks, leaving the theories broken and un-
able to defend themselves against opposing views. 
 
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
SCIENCE THROUGH METAPHOR 
 
I would now like to briefly point to some of the implica-
tions of these findings on studying objectivity and other episte-
mological concepts, as well as science. The first point is a meth-
odological one. Metaphor, with its significant and distinctive role 
in expressing and defending conceptions of objectivity, as well as 
its close, mutually illuminating ties with historical context, ought 
to be given close attention when seeking to understand the his-
tory of objectivity. Indeed, such analyses can be extended to 
other concepts when engaging in historical meta-epistemology. 
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As has been shown, metaphor cannot be ignored, as it is partly 
constitutive of the theories under consideration, nor can it be 
"translated" into purely literal terms, and it certainly cannot be 
dismissed as mere ornamentation. Indeed, some suggest that an 
acknowledgement of metaphor's role in concept-formation could 
have far-reaching consequences for the methods of analytic phi-
losophy in general.44 
Attention to metaphor will help to better understand sci-
ence. That two of the most important proponents of scientific ob-
jectivity, Bacon and Popper, should face a dilemma that under-
mines their views is significant. It suggests that their conceptions 
of objectivity, and the conceptions descended from them, face 
some real difficulties. I believe that the foregoing analysis pro-
vides further evidence to move us away from such views, and 
towards those that recognize that metaphor is pervasive in sci-
ence and necessary for its development. Metaphor is instrumen-
tal in the formation of scientific concepts, as "almost everywhere 
one looks in science there are things being treated as something 
else."45 Metaphor and analogy also play an important role in sci-
entific education. Finally, I believe that the findings of this analy-
sis lend support to Kuhn's conception of the development of sci-
ence through paradigms, and that a greater awareness of meta-
phor in science will deepen our understanding of the nature and 
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sis (which, I believe, is Popper’s real target here) does not assert the 
impossibility of translation, but rather points to the fact that a person 
cannot speak in more than one language at the same time. See Kuhn, The 
Essential Tension, 1997.  
39. Popper, pg. 57.  
40. I wish to emphasize that I do not consider these contradictions to be 
total or of a purely logical nature (hence, the term ‘dilemma’ should not 
be taken in the strictly formal sense that it has in logic); rather, I assert 
that the metaphors are problematic to the extent that, or insofar as their 
nature and function conflict with the theories of which they are a part.   
41. Popper, pg. 60.  
42. Bacon, pg. 81.  
43. Ricoeur, pg. 50.  
44. See Bloor’s "Dialectics of Metaphor," 1971, and Lakoff and Johnson’s 
Metaphors We Live By, 2003.  
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